Particularly, I thought the section discussed on Simulacra and Simulation quite intriguing. Baudrillard looks at the idea of simulation in a deeper level. Simulacrum, first termed by Plato himself, essentially is defined as a duplicate without having had an original form in the first place. I especially like how Ken relates simulacrum with that of the ET ride at Universal Studios or Epcot in Disney World. Both of these attractions appear to be simulations, but, in reality, they are merely false depictions of reality. These simulations of reality blur the authentic version of reality, thus, creating the hyperreal. If one reaches the point of discovering the real, the real will perpetually be a result of the simulation. In The Matrix, Neo chooses to find out the truth of what reality really is. To his dismay, he discovers that it is a computer-generated world where humanity in a dream world. Yet, another example of simulacra.
Going beyond the hyperreal, Baudrillard grapples with the notion of “integral reality.” Money, for instance, can be used in credit form. Purposely putting off payment of a certain item is made possible by the process of purchasing an item, swiping a piece of plastic between another plastic mechanism, and never actually having a chance to view the money. This is a false reality of consumption—going back to Baudrillard’s theory that consumption makes the capitalist world go round.
Thursday, October 30, 2008
Friday, October 24, 2008
Author - text = Reader
An author is commonly referred to as the main focal point of a particular text. If a person were asked the question what is an author, they would presumably reply with the description of one who is autonomous, one who is the center of attention, a transmitter of cultural values or ideas who constructs these value in a literal way, etcetera. An author takes a reality and regurgitates it onto a page, so to speak. This would be considered a more liberal humanist approach to this question. Foucault, however, asks for a different answer to whom an author really is. In his essay “What is an Author?” Foucault questions who an author is by taking a given and deconstructing the center ultimately creating a problem. Elaborating on the idea given to us by Roland Barthes in “Death of an Author” that the death of the author brings about the birth of the reader, Foucault asks what the author did in the first place to initiate his/her demise.
Throughout history, Foucault explains that the author was not always autonomous and central within a text. He discusses “author-function,” where an author is “a function of discourse.” In ancient times, Foucault states that “(stories, folk tales, epics, and tragedies) were accepted, circulated, and valorized without any question about the identity of their authenticity.”(1264Foucault). Later on around the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the opposite idea was taken within literary discourse. A text of fiction, poetry, drama, and others were required to label with the name author and the date and place in which a text was produced. In order for a text to be valued and accredited, authorship information had to be presented. In the realm of mathematics and science, for example, it was not necessary to label mathematical/scientific discoveries with an author during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. In fact, these texts were “accepted on their own merits ad positioned within an anonymous and coherent conceptual system of established truths and methods of verification,” (1264Foucault). Only a theorem, an equation, a law, etcetera were labeled to acknowledge the inventor. Conversely in the Middle Ages, the name of the author was thought to have been the source of truthfulness with the indication of an author.
I would like, if I may, to take a bold leap into the depths of the Panopticon theory of Foucault. Panoptic essentially means “all-seeing.” Foucault discusses the idea of the panoptical prison where the guards centered in the middle of the room and the prisoners surrounding them in a circular formation. One could argue that it is quite similar to the idea of authorship. The author could very well be located within the center, like that of the guards. The author is in a space where he or she has the ability to see all of the prisoners from the middle. The prisoners very well may be the readers looking towards the center at the author (or guard). If these prisoners overthrow the guards, engage in a sort of revolt against the center, they then will be liberated. The same goes for authorship. If the author is removed from the center, then the readers will have the freedom to interpret a text, without any influence or control over their views. With the multiplicity of readers, the multiplicity of texts will come to light. The readers come “I” instead the author. Perhaps this is the message Foucault is trying to proclaim in his essay.
While reading Foucault Blog, (http://foucaultblog.wordpress.com/2007/08/07/facebook-is-the-new-panopticon/) Jeremy argues that Facebook is the new panopticon of the millennia. Zuckerman, creator of this online friendship networking site, says that he created it to promote pleasure for the common good. Foucault, in the 1970s, said that the panopitcon is ‘to induce in the inmate a state of conscious and permanent visibility that assures the automatic functioning of power.’ The prison mate ‘is seen, but he does not see; he is the object of information, never a subject in communication.’ Jeremy goes on to say that members of Facebook are both guards and prisoners: guards in which they have access to the viewing of peoples’ profiles and prisoners for imprisoning themselves into Facebook, a possible metaphor for a prison cell. Jeremy says, “We relinquish ourselves to others, but have the luxury of indulging in everyone else’s surrender of secrecy.” Whether this is the case or not, it is an interesting concept and certainly relates to the idea of the author and the reader.
Throughout history, Foucault explains that the author was not always autonomous and central within a text. He discusses “author-function,” where an author is “a function of discourse.” In ancient times, Foucault states that “(stories, folk tales, epics, and tragedies) were accepted, circulated, and valorized without any question about the identity of their authenticity.”(1264Foucault). Later on around the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the opposite idea was taken within literary discourse. A text of fiction, poetry, drama, and others were required to label with the name author and the date and place in which a text was produced. In order for a text to be valued and accredited, authorship information had to be presented. In the realm of mathematics and science, for example, it was not necessary to label mathematical/scientific discoveries with an author during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. In fact, these texts were “accepted on their own merits ad positioned within an anonymous and coherent conceptual system of established truths and methods of verification,” (1264Foucault). Only a theorem, an equation, a law, etcetera were labeled to acknowledge the inventor. Conversely in the Middle Ages, the name of the author was thought to have been the source of truthfulness with the indication of an author.
I would like, if I may, to take a bold leap into the depths of the Panopticon theory of Foucault. Panoptic essentially means “all-seeing.” Foucault discusses the idea of the panoptical prison where the guards centered in the middle of the room and the prisoners surrounding them in a circular formation. One could argue that it is quite similar to the idea of authorship. The author could very well be located within the center, like that of the guards. The author is in a space where he or she has the ability to see all of the prisoners from the middle. The prisoners very well may be the readers looking towards the center at the author (or guard). If these prisoners overthrow the guards, engage in a sort of revolt against the center, they then will be liberated. The same goes for authorship. If the author is removed from the center, then the readers will have the freedom to interpret a text, without any influence or control over their views. With the multiplicity of readers, the multiplicity of texts will come to light. The readers come “I” instead the author. Perhaps this is the message Foucault is trying to proclaim in his essay.
While reading Foucault Blog, (http://foucaultblog.wordpress.com/2007/08/07/facebook-is-the-new-panopticon/) Jeremy argues that Facebook is the new panopticon of the millennia. Zuckerman, creator of this online friendship networking site, says that he created it to promote pleasure for the common good. Foucault, in the 1970s, said that the panopitcon is ‘to induce in the inmate a state of conscious and permanent visibility that assures the automatic functioning of power.’ The prison mate ‘is seen, but he does not see; he is the object of information, never a subject in communication.’ Jeremy goes on to say that members of Facebook are both guards and prisoners: guards in which they have access to the viewing of peoples’ profiles and prisoners for imprisoning themselves into Facebook, a possible metaphor for a prison cell. Jeremy says, “We relinquish ourselves to others, but have the luxury of indulging in everyone else’s surrender of secrecy.” Whether this is the case or not, it is an interesting concept and certainly relates to the idea of the author and the reader.
Wednesday, October 15, 2008
"I Think Where I am Not"
In the Derrida film, Derrida says “And there where there is improvisation I am not able to see myself.” He relates this idea of improvisation to pure forgiveness and reconciliation. He states that to achieve pure forgiveness is impossible. One would reach this level of forgiveness by being able to forgive what may seem to be the unforgivable. Reconciliation is not to forgive, per se, but to do so for a purpose of diplomacy, of therapeutic means, and so on and so forth. Improvisation is to “reproduce stereotypical discourse.” The notion of improvisation is almost like a mask being worn by a person, concealing one’s true self. He goes on to say that improvisation inhibits a person from being able to fully visualize the self.
Lacan reverses Descartes recognized philosophy “I think therefore I am,” by saying “I think where I am not, therefore I am where I do not think.” Descartes’ view is that the self is the conscious mind which is the very center of selfhood. Lacan states the opposite. He says that the center of selfhood is the unconscious mind. This is where the true self dwells. Very much like Derrida’s concept of the self and the Other, Lacan poses the question ‘who is this other to whom I am more attached than myself, since at the heart of my assent to my own identity it is still he who wags me?(113Barry). As Derrida uses deconstruction to interpret a particular subject matter, Lacan deconstructs the self to reveal it as a linguistic result and not a fundamental being. He relates the unconscious to language. Like Derrida’s concepts, Lacan interprets language to live as a structure even prior to the admission of the person.
Lacan reverses Descartes recognized philosophy “I think therefore I am,” by saying “I think where I am not, therefore I am where I do not think.” Descartes’ view is that the self is the conscious mind which is the very center of selfhood. Lacan states the opposite. He says that the center of selfhood is the unconscious mind. This is where the true self dwells. Very much like Derrida’s concept of the self and the Other, Lacan poses the question ‘who is this other to whom I am more attached than myself, since at the heart of my assent to my own identity it is still he who wags me?(113Barry). As Derrida uses deconstruction to interpret a particular subject matter, Lacan deconstructs the self to reveal it as a linguistic result and not a fundamental being. He relates the unconscious to language. Like Derrida’s concepts, Lacan interprets language to live as a structure even prior to the admission of the person.
Friday, October 10, 2008
Derrida Film
In the ambitious documentary film Derrida, Jacques Derrida is interviewed and followed by a camera crew, chronicling his day-to-day life. Amy Zierring Kofman and Kirby Dick go through rigorous interviews with Derrida attempting to uncover information from his personal life and his world-renowned philosophy. They depict a man of great sophistication, with silvery locks of grandeur, an off-beat persona, and, above all, a man with remarkable vision. Throughout the interview process, Derrida makes it close to impossible to obtain a direct answer from him. According to Derrida, being filmed by a camera crew and being asked inane questions is unnatural. One cannot “…naturalize what isn’t natural.” Referring to cameras, these “archiving machines” make his entire interview a false personification of who he is. “Everything is false, almost everything…I’m not really like this.” In a scene, Derrida and his wife Margarite are asked how they came to have met. Derrida only answers the question with a series of facts, dates, the where and the how, but either one do not share the personal feelings of their meeting. Again, it would be a kind of artificial description. The telling of their story would be inadequate to portray in front of a camera crew.
Continuously, there is a struggle between the interviewer and the interviewee. Amy asks Derrida what he thinks love could be. A bit irritated by this question, Derrida tells her he cannot possibly answer such a question without “reciting clichés.” Eventually, he gives an answer to the question. Love is narcissistic. Is love a love of someone or something? Is it a love of the person entirely, or is it the love of the person’s certain attributes. One may be in love with another for their great intelligence or their beauty or their talent. If someone loses the qualities you came to fall in love with in the first place, this is the death of love or lack of fidelity. Hegel says that eyes are a manifestation of the soul, revealing your true self to the Other. All through the interview process, Derrida seeks to deconstruct it, delving deep into the center and destabilizing the asked question. Not only does he do this toward the interview questions, but also to himself. Almost each scene reveals a different Derrida. Sometimes he is tidy, sometimes he is unkempt. Other times he is speaking in French, and other times in English. He may be giving a lecture at a university or a semi-lecture in his own kitchen. As the viewer, it is difficult for us to distinguish which Derrida is the real and natural Derrida. That is a matter of interpretation I guess, and perhaps that is Derrida’s reason for going through this interview.
Continuously, there is a struggle between the interviewer and the interviewee. Amy asks Derrida what he thinks love could be. A bit irritated by this question, Derrida tells her he cannot possibly answer such a question without “reciting clichés.” Eventually, he gives an answer to the question. Love is narcissistic. Is love a love of someone or something? Is it a love of the person entirely, or is it the love of the person’s certain attributes. One may be in love with another for their great intelligence or their beauty or their talent. If someone loses the qualities you came to fall in love with in the first place, this is the death of love or lack of fidelity. Hegel says that eyes are a manifestation of the soul, revealing your true self to the Other. All through the interview process, Derrida seeks to deconstruct it, delving deep into the center and destabilizing the asked question. Not only does he do this toward the interview questions, but also to himself. Almost each scene reveals a different Derrida. Sometimes he is tidy, sometimes he is unkempt. Other times he is speaking in French, and other times in English. He may be giving a lecture at a university or a semi-lecture in his own kitchen. As the viewer, it is difficult for us to distinguish which Derrida is the real and natural Derrida. That is a matter of interpretation I guess, and perhaps that is Derrida’s reason for going through this interview.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)